The author attempts to verify whether defining totalitarianism in terms of a state striving to obtain total control over the life of individuals and collectives is a proper approach. Does totalitarianism genuinely imply a society completely subordinated to a state? And, in dealing with the political realities of a totalitarian regime, can we consider a totality other than that created by the state? The author reaches for Carl Schmitt’s reflections on political totality and its subjects. It is thanks to this (...) approach that we are able to look at a totalitarian structure more primal than a state, the structure that is a total society. The author presents a historical and philosophical description of the process of forming a total society, which begins with the discontinuation of the distance between that which falls to the state and that which falls to society. (shrink)

The idea of a law-governed state, which is referred to so commonly, exists as a synonym of the principle of the supreme meaning and standing of the constitution in the state system. The law-governed state in its pure form is one where the law provides not only the framework and barriers for the state and the actions of the authorities, but a state wherein its beginning and foundations are rooted in the law. The concept of the law-governed state has many (...) highly detailed elements ; its essence, however, is the recognition of the law as a particular means and a yardstick with which both the state’s system and the recognition of the legal standards vested with the power to shape social relationships, the regulatory power, are moulded. It is the prestige of the law – nomos basileus – which should be the source of state order. The supremacy of the law provides the premise on which the introduction of every detailed solution which turns the idea of the law-governed state into specifics, is based. If the rule of law, rather than that of the authorities is to exist, this must be a law wherein each citizen may contribute to its shape; ideally it will be one established directly by the citizens rather than by the established authorities, democratic in an indirect way. This must be a law binding upon everyone equally, observed by everyone, operating effectively and surely. It must also be a law made for society’s sake rather than for that of an idea, and it must be fitting to those realities, standards and common practices that exist in that society. It must also be a law not too rigorous and imposing neither excessive requirements nor strange measures. (shrink)

There are aspects of privacy theory that are analogous to quantum theory. In particular one can define distillable key and key cost in parallel to distillable entanglement and entanglement cost. We present here classical privacy theory as a particular case of information theory with adversaries, where similar general laws hold as in entanglement theory. We place the result of Renner and Wolf—that intrinsic information is lower bound for key cost—into this general formalism. Then we show that the question of whether (...) intrinsic information is equal to key cost is equivalent to the question of whether Alice and Bob can create a distribution product with Eve using I M bits of secret key. We also propose a natural analogue of relative entropy of entanglement in privacy theory and show that it is equal to the intrinsic information. We also provide a formula analogous to the entanglement of formation for classical distributions. (shrink)

This article contains a summary of selected theses of the theory of the state developed by Hermann Heller, who was one of the leading representatives of the so-called Weimar Theory of the State. State theorists of the Weimar era formed an independent, formally unrelated group of scientists who had often opposing views, but were united by a common effort to conduct even philosophical investigation of the nature of the state, the European, continental state, as well as its internal ratio and (...) mission. In addition to Hermann Heller, this group included Carl Schmitt, Rudolf Smend, Erich Kaufmann and Heinrich Triepel. They asked questions which are absent in today’s science, such as: “What is a state?”, “What kind of being is it and what is its nature?”. The answers determine many issues, including our perception of the durability and strength of the state, our understanding of its structure and development, the relation between the state and the individual and the relation between politics and history, etc. No settlement of this basic issue is not only simple negligence, but – as can be judged – it stems from today’s tacit assumption that the state is not a being, but only an artificial human construct, a combination of elements and a set of institutions. Heller perceives the state substantially: as particular organization of social affairs; organization of specific areas of public life: economy, law and public opinion. These were created in the modern era and have been specific to Europe from the sixteenth century to modern times. The matter of these areas is transformed into a state order by sovereign authorities. Therefore, their policies and their law have their concrete object whose reality they face, and they need to demonstrate that they are capable of organizing this reality. The ethos of the state and at the same time the legitimacy of its power require that elementary principles of justice are ensured, or at least injustice is eliminated from social life. (shrink)

According to Carl Schmitt, the phenomenon of the political has different forms. These forms can be distinguished based on different possible relationships between political action and the state. This article presents the history of what Schmitt refers to as the phenomenon of partisanship. Partisanship is a specific form of politics, established in the early ninetieth century, which has gradually expanded its presence. Partisan activity is characterized by totality, which has evolved to become the dominant component of political action over time, (...) particularly in the twentieth century. This totality affects not only the size and range of political activity, but it is also – and perhaps first of all – ruthless in its use of terror and violence, which is considered entirely justified by total partisans/terrorists. (shrink)

The author describes the moment of the emergence of the concept of sovereignty, its causes, historical significance, as well as the issues raised in the debate over this concept since the seventeenth century. Sovereignty refers to the state and points to its essential feature, which defines the state as the result of occidental rationalism (Max Weber). According to this definition, the state is different from other, earlier and parallel political forms, such as republics and empires. However, changes in the history (...) of the state also affect the way in which sovereignty is understood. Consequently, the concept of sovereignty is often difficult to justify or is even – as some authors claim – anachronistic. The author outlines different approaches in the discussion about the validity of this concept and their premises. He also describes the relationship between the principle of sovereignty and the democratic rule of law. (shrink)

The main issue is: what is the State? An article presents what the concept of State entails, the essential elements of its structure, and the basic stages of its development. The State is a historical creation. It has a specific existential cause and purpose, and a set organizational framework within which its entire ethical and political substance must be inscribed. The framework and the substance of the State are distinct spheres, and the awareness of the distinction between these two spheres (...) is important. At the same time, they can only be distinguished in the abstract. In reality one cannot separate them or glimpse them functioning separately, as if on different levels. In reality both dimensions interpenetrate and are mixed together. The organizational dimension only exists as a condition for the axiological, albeit a necessary condition. The other, axiological dimension is also necessary, but in a different way. The first is necessary because of the realities of life, the real situation. The second is necessary in the moral sense. Necessity in the moral sense is immutable, whereas the necessity of an organizational framework depends on the historical-social situation and can therefore change. Thus, if the conditions, circumstances or the factual situation should change, then the organizational framework could actually turn out to be useless, whereas the values and ideals remained necessary. (shrink)

The author presents defi nitions of the concepts ‘state’ and ‘sovereignty’, which were formed in the modern era on the grounds of the European philosophy of politics, and reads them in the context of the Polish historical and political experience. He posits that the two concepts make up an inseparable whole belonging to the European tradition of statehood, in which sovereignty is the fundamental feature of a state and of a political structure, a feature which such a structure, if it (...) constitutes a state must, in a way, by definition, possess. Sovereignty is a unique feature of a state because it stands apart from state’s other traits; it also stands apart from the state itself. It is distinct among other features, because the latter assume its existence, as it is only a sovereign state which can have the real, authentic and lasting features which determine its identity and character. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of numeracy and the emotion of fear on the decision-making process. While previous research demonstrated that these factors are independently related to search effort, search policy and choice in a decision from experience task, less is known about how their interaction contributes to processing information under uncertainty. We attempted to address this problem and to fill this gap. In the present study, we hypothesized that more numerate people would sample more (...) information about a decision problem and that the effect of fear would depend on the source of this emotion: whether it is integral (i.e., relevant) or incidental (i.e., irrelevant) to a decision problem. Additionally, we tested how these factors predict choices. We addressed these hypotheses in a series of two experiments. In each experiment, we used a sampling paradigm to measure search effort, search policy and choice in nine binary problems included in a decision from experience task. In Experiment 1, before the sampling task we elicited incidental fear by asking participants to recall fearful events from their life. In Experiment 2, integral fear was elicited by asking participants to make choices concerning medical treatment. Decision problems and their payoff distributions were the same in the two experiments and across each condition. In both experiments, we assessed objective statistical numeracy and controlled for a change in the current emotional state. We found that more numerate people sampled more information about a decision problem and switched less frequently between alternatives. Incidental fear marginally predicted search effort. Integral fear led to larger sample sizes, but only among more numerate people. Neither numeracy nor fear were related to the number of choices that maximized expected values. However, across two experiments sample sizes predicted the number of choices that maximized experienced mean returns. The findings suggest that people with higher numeracy may be more sensitive to integral emotions; this may result in more effortful sampling of relevant information leading to choices maximizing experienced returns. (shrink)

W swojej książce Tropy i uniwersalia: Badania ontologiczne zaproponowałem systematyczną i historyczną analizę problemu uniwersaliów. Odróżniłem trzy podstawowe pojęcia powszechników, rozumianych kolejno jako wspólne własności, wspólne aspekty i wspólne całości, a następnie zastosowałem je do szczegółowej analizy teorii Romana Ingardena, św. Tomasza z Akwinu i Georga Wilhelma Friedricha Hegla. W tym tekście przedstawiam założenia metodologiczne mojej pracy, przyjmowane przeze mnie rozumienie powszechników i główne rezultaty moich interpretacji. Następnie omawiam krótko dyskusje, jakie wywołała moja książka. Katarzyna Barska i Marek Piwowarczyk kwestionowali (...) moje odczytanie teorii Ingardena, a Tomasz Tiuryn i Michał Głowala krytykowali moją interpretację stanowiska św. Tomasza. Na koniec pokazuję, w jaki sposób Karol Kleczka ciekawie rozwinął interpretację pojęcia konkretnego powszechnika w ramach współczesnej teorii uprawdziwiania. (shrink)

The Polish philosophy of mathematics in the 19th century had its origins in the Romantic period under the influence of the then-predominant idealist philosophies. The decline of Romantic philosophy precipitated changes in general philosophy, but what is less well known is how it triggered changes in the philosophy of mathematics. In this paper, we discuss how the Polish philosophy of mathematics evolved from the metaphysical approach that had been formed during the Romantic era to the more modern positivistic paradigm. These (...) evolutionary changes are attributed to the philosophers Henryk Struve, Antoni Molicki and Julian Ochorowicz, and mathematicians Karol Hertz and Samuel Dickstein. We also show how implicit ideas (i.e., those not declared openly) from the area between the philosophy of science and general philosophy played a crucial role in the paradigm shift in the Polish philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

The Polish philosophy of mathematics in the 19th century is not a well-researched topic. For this period, only five philosophers are usually mentioned, namely Jan Śniadecki, Józef Maria Hoene-Wroński, Henryk Struve, Samuel Dickstein, and Edward Stamm. This limited and incomplete perspective does not allow us to develop a well-balanced picture of the Polish philosophy of mathematics and gauge its influence on 19th- and 20th-century Polish philosophy in general. To somewhat complete our picture of the history of the Polish philosophy of (...) mathematics in those times, we here present the profiles of some lesser-known Polish Romantic philosophers of the 19th century, namely Karol Libelt, Bronisław Trentowski, and Józef Kremer. We discuss their contributions to the philosophy of mathematics and their metaphysical perspectives, and we also show how their metaphysical ideas have found some continuity in the studies of some Catholic philosophers. (shrink)

This article explores the experiences of the revolutionary-left opposition in the People’s Republic of Poland, a bureaucratic post-capitalist state established after WWII. It draws heavily upon Andrzej Friszke’s research concentrated on the 1960s, when post-1956 oppositional activity emerged and had an impact on the public sphere. The aim of this article is to present Marxist and revolutionary trends within oppositional circles mainly via the political trajectory of two important figures associated with revolutionary Marxism during the ‘People’s Poland’ of the 1960s, (...) Jacek Kuroń and Karol Modzelewski, and their later attitudes during the military dictatorship and the restoration of capitalism in Poland. It also focuses on Kuroń and Modzelewski’s relations with Ludwik Hass, a controversial Polish Trotskyist, and Trotskyism as a political doctrine; and the 1980s’ general tendency toward workers’ democracy in factories, before the advent of martial law implemented by General Wojciech Jaruzelski in December 1981. (shrink)

Brain activity determines which relations between objects in the environment are perceived as differences and similarities in colour, smell, sound, etc. According to selectionism, brain activity does not create those relations; it only selects which of them are perceptually available to the subject on a given occasion. In effect, selectionism entails that perceptual experience is diaphanous, i.e. that sameness and difference in the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by sameness and difference in the perceived items. It has been argued (...) that diaphaneity is undermined by phenomenological considerations and empirical evidence. This paper considers five prominent arguments of this sort and shows that none of them succeeds. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Diltheys Erlebnisbegriff" verfügbar.

According to grounding necessitarianism if some facts ground another fact, then the obtaining of the former necessitates the latter. Proponents of grounding contingentism argue against this claim, stating that it is possible for the former facts to obtain without necessitating the latter. In this article I discuss a recent argument from restricted accidental generalisations provided by contingentists that advances such possibility. I argue that grounding necessitarianism can be defended against it. To achieve this aim, I postulate a relationship between grounding (...) and essence by introducing a notion of individual essences understood as a set of essential properties that individuate its bearer. According to a proposed view grounding holds in virtue of identities of its relata, which are in turn determined by their respective individual essences. From there I claim that if grounding holds in virtue of the individual essences of its relata, then it is possible to resist the objection from restricted accidental generalisations and maintain a view that grounds necessitates what is grounded. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider how an agent may manage a questioning agenda in a situation where multiple information sources are available. We work within the framework of formal dialogue systems with the underpinning of Inferential Erotetic Logic. Firstly, we present the formal dialogue system DL(IEL)mult for managing multi-agent information retrieval. Then, we extend the proposed system so that it is capable of representing group and individual levels for the question decomposition process. We also propose two measures for evaluating information (...) sources: their cooperativeness and success levels; next, we analyse how the choice of agents may influence the way in which a solution for a given problem is reached. (shrink)

According to the predictive coding theory of cognition , brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in (...) the sense that it postulates that our cognitive contact with the world is mediated by internal representations. However, the exact sense in which PCT is representational remains unclear; neither is it clear that it deserves such status—that is, whether it really invokes structures that are truly and nontrivially representational in nature. In the present article, I argue that the representational pretensions of PCT are completely justified. This is because the theory postulates cognitive structures—namely action-guiding, detachable, structural models that afford representational error detection—that play genuinely representational functions within the cognitive system. (shrink)

This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using (...) system. Then, we discuss crucial differences between S-representations and indicators or detectors, showing that—contrary to claims made in the literature—there is an important theoretical distinction to be drawn between the two. (shrink)

We investigate a simple game paradigm for intuitionistic logic, inspired by Wajsberg’s implicit inhabitation algorithm and Beth tableaux. The principal idea is that one player, ∃ros, is trying to construct a proof in normal form while his opponent, ∀phrodite, attempts to build a counter-model. The determinacy of the game implies therefore both completeness and semantic cut-elimination.

In the past centuries Maṇḍana Miśra was regarded as the most prominent figure of the advaita school of philosophy, to the extent that the whole system of advaita was frequently described by his name as ‘maṇḍana-matam’ (‘the view of Maṇḍana’). Nowadays advaita is almost exclusively associated, if not identified, with the name of Maṇḍana’s contemporary Śaṅkara. Both thinkers philosophizing along advaita lines, their views on the ultimate being, the highest bliss, ignorance etc. were substantially different. The present paper is intended (...) as a bird’s eye view on the whole of Maṇḍana’s legacy, including his Sphoṭasiddhi, being his contribution to the grammatical tradi­tion of Bhartṛhari. It is also aimed at finding the reason why in the hierarchy of eminent advaita thinkers Maṇḍana was eventually supplanted by Śaṅkara and his œuvre unacknowledged. (shrink)

Modernity and What Has Been Lost comes out of a conference held at the Jagiellonian University in Krakw̤, Poland, on June 4-5, 2009 that sought to identify Leo Strauss's intellectual background in re: the repudiation of a modern idea of homogenous, universal state (considered as an illegitimate synthesis of Jerusalem and Athens, i.e., the claims of Reason and Revelation). The world we live in, molded by science and historical relativism, may be described as hostile to human dignity or perfection, or (...) abhorrent to those who love the search for wisdom. Straussian teaching consisted in the steady effort to reopen "the quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns," and refers to the esoteric way of writing practiced by the most profound thinkers of the past which has been apparently forgotten in the last three centuries. Strauss binds the concept of natural right with the question of maintenance of conditions for philosophizing, and it probably seems to him that such defense of philosophy is the highest task in our times. However, one must be well aware that philosophizing always means a perilous way of life. Indeed, it may be destructive of the city (polis) itself as far as the city exists due to some crucial beliefs the philosopher might put in doubt. Reflecting on those issues, Strauss engaged in several highly important debates with his contemporaries, in an open way with, e.g., Carl Schmitt, Karl Lw̲ith and Alexandre Kojv̈e, and more tacitly with Martin Heidegger"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

The title of this article refers to one of the best-known essays written by David Hume, That Politics may be reduced to a Science. Hume assumed that politics was a science because it admitted of some general truths, which could not be varied by human beings. He adopted a similar stance, albeit indirectly, in the case of economics, discovering several general truths concerning the origins of wealth, money and international trade. At times, however, he was far from being consistent and (...) this undermined these truths. Consequently, it can be argued that, from his perspective, economics was a science on a theoretical level, but it lost this character at a more practical level. Similar doubts can be raised when it comes to Hume’s role in the history of economic thought. In some respects he was an original thinker, but several of his key concepts resembled to some extent ideas that had been put forward by ‘mercantilists’, especially those ‘mercantilists’ who were active in his native Scotland in the first decade of the 18 th century. (shrink)

We study the intersection type assignment system as defined by Barendregt, Coppo and Dezani. For the four essential variants of the system (with and without a universal type and with and without subtyping) we show that the emptiness (inhabitation) problem is recursively unsolvable. That is, there is no effective algorithm to decide if there is a closed term of a given type. It follows that provability in the logic of "strong conjunction" of Mints and Lopez-Escobar is also undecidable.

_Beyond Reason_ relates Wagner’s works to the philosophical and cultural ideas of his time, centering on the four music dramas he created in the second half of his career:_ Der Ring des Nibelungen_, _Tristan und Isolde_, _Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg_, and _Parsifal_. Karol Berger seeks to penetrate the “secret” of large-scale form in Wagner’s music dramas and to answer those critics, most prominently Nietzsche, who condemned Wagner for his putative inability to weld small expressive gestures into larger wholes. Organized (...) by individual opera, this is essential reading for both musicologists and Wagner experts. (shrink)

I borrow part of the title of my paper from Susan Sontag. In 2003, a year before her death, Susan Sontag published an essay entitled Regarding the Pain of Others. There she takes up the subject of the moral significance of presenting the views of war, violent human death exposed to the lenses of cameras. Her approach to the contemporary issue of mediatisation through the image of the sight of human suffering provokes a question: Do we need teleethics today, the (...) ethics of remote moral relations? Using the method of comparative analysis in the area of cultural determinants of ethics, I draw attention to the contemporary challenges that the culture of late modernity imposes on the morality of everyday life. My thesis is this: The images of human suffering provided by the media reveal the imperfection of our morality. As moral subjects, we are not prepared to respond to the suffering of human beings absent from face-to-face relationships. So, we need teleethics. The paper is devoted to this issue. (shrink)